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The concept of social networks has for 
some decades now constituted a particu-
larly useful theoretical and methodological 
tool, especially in sociological approaches 
to history. This article attempts to distin-
guish the functionality of what I refer to as 
power networks within the framework of an 
empire, specifically the Ottoman Empire. My 
major aim, however, is to propose how two 
parallel debates, which are being conducted 
both explicitly and implicitly in studies inter-
nationally, could be brought together: in other 
words, how useful are the discussions con-
cerning previous empires to understanding 
or interpreting a contemporary phenomenon 
which a number of highly perceptive ob-
servers have characterized as “empire”?1 
Before concluding that networks can provide 
the touchstone for the solution of traditional 
problems of social theory (mainly that of 
structure–subject relations), it is necessary 
to look at the origin of the concept. First of 
all, the concept of networks is balanced on a 
tightrope between the realms of politics and 
scholarship, and as a result has a particular 
semantic content capable of annulling its 
advantages. Its scholarly origins may be 
traced to the development of sociometric 
analysis by the representatives of the Ge-
stalt tradition in psychology, as much as to 
the structural-functional approach as elabo-
rated by Harvard researchers in the nineteen 
thirties and the social anthropologists of the 
Manchester School in the post-war period.2 
At any rate, the concept’s sanction was con-
nected with the flowering of informatics and 
communication studies in the US, and with 
the development of the school of first-order 
cybernetics at Palo Alto in particular.3 
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However, the term passed quickly into political parlance in the nineteen sixties, enriching the critique 
then being directed against the hierarchical, vertically structured party organizational model. The 
concept was used to describe a horizontal form of direct democratic organization, which would 
enable the unmediated political involvement of social subjects. It had the advantage of simultane-
ously connecting the normative demand for the formation of new democratic political institutions 
with contemporary investigations being carried out in the social sciences, investigations which con-
tributed to the formation of a dominant epistemological paradigm based on the concept of space.4
It is not possible here to extend the analysis to the fundamental relationship between the pre-
dominance of the epistemological paradigm of space and the growth of communication studies 
or semiotics.5 However, its effect on the renewal of the social sciences was decisive during the 
first post-war decades. Space became the epicenter of the interest of many scholars, especially 
in the context of wider interdisciplinary research programs. There is a wealth of examples: one 
could start with geographic determinism of Fernand Braudel in his early work6 and arrive at 
the epistemological model of Gaston Bachelard7 and the “archaeology of knowledge” of Michel 
Foucault.8 Generally speaking, modern theoretical thought took as its fundamental problem the 
relationship between the historical perspective and the concept of space. This was due primarily 
to the necessity of repositioning the issue of the origins and exercise of power as it was under-
stood by post-structuralism’s most important representatives.9
On the basis of the terms of opposition between the proponents of its two major contemporary 
theoretical currents, the realists and constructivists, the networks approach is both legitimate and 
requisite. According to the former, approaching the concept of networks through applied mathe-
matical and sociological models enables an investigation of the internal structure of power relations 
and tendencies in the formation of leadership elites in both pre-modern and modern societies.10 
From the standpoint of the latter, the usefulness of the networks concept can be shown in analy-
ses of hybrid epistemological objects. The networks constitute the invisible web, permeating three 
traditionally discernible scientific fields: that of facts (epistemology), power (social sciences) and dis-
courses (rhetoric).11 Usually, the realists are inclined to take the concept’s use in a strict sense, while 
the constructivists as a metaphor.12 Arguably, it is not accidental that these two opposing schools 
converge, both theoretically and methodologically, in their research programs on network analysis. 
This is due to the inability of the realists to attribute, without theoretical consequences, the reduction 
of the social phenomena to the language of mathematics, thus ignoring the production of meaning’s 
process and the practical-communicative agency. Nor can the constructivists complete their attack 
on the truth criteria of the dominant epistemological paradigms by reducing social phenomena to 
the form of language code. The reality of social networks constitutes the field most capable of re-
shaping the lost unity of the subject’s praxis and the rise of political entities and power relations. 
Machiavelli as Metaphor: Some Theoretical Explanations
Although they are the inheritors of the long tradition which identifies the development of networks 
with democratic political involvement, Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt do not seem to have 
understood that establishing a correspondence between the normative-political use of the concept 
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and its scholarly validity is not easy. Arguably, they do not address it as a fundamental theoretical 
problem. The concept of networks, or rather that of “network power” and the corresponding “net-
work production”, which are critical for the elaboration of the authors’ argument, appear at various 
points in Empire. The former concept surfaces when they identify it as one of the decisive elements 
in the formation of the US (with reference to the American constitution and the ‘founding fathers’), 
arguing that “power can be constituted by a whole series of powers that regulate themselves and 
arrange themselves in networks”.13 The latter concept appears when the authors deal with a sub-
ject more familiar to them,14 namely, the analysis of the post-Fordist/post-Taylorist models which 
held sway in the West after the oil crises of the nineteen seventies.15
Negri and Hardt’s insistence on the rise of network organization of political and economic space 
should not be seen as accidental. Inspired by the historical synthesis of Polybius in his The Rise 
of the Roman Empire, as reformulated in the republican vision of Machiavelli,16 which holds the 
imperial model as historically incarnated in Rome to be a synthesis of the three Aristotelian 
systems of government (monarchy or principality, aristocracy and democracy), they attempt to 
find basic correspondences with contemporary “de-territorialized” (as they call it) empire. 
It is worth recalling here that Machiavelli’s explanatory approach to Polybius is found in the 
idea that if a state wishes to deter its progressive decline, it should include at the basic level the 
three primary regimes, whose definition Aristotle had provided in his Politics. If the state (and 
its prince) were to avoid the degradation of monarchy to tyranny, of aristocracy to oligarchy, 
and democracy to mob rule, it had to amalgamate the basic principles of fundamental forms of 
government on a unified constitutional basis. As Machiavelli explained:
I maintain then, that all the forms of government mentioned above are far from satisfactory, 
the three good ones because their life is so short, the three bad ones because of their inherent 
malignity. Hence prudent legislators, aware of their defects, refrained from the adopting as such 
of any one of these forms, and chose instead one that shared in them all, since they thought 
such a government would be stronger and more stable, for if in one and the same state there 
was principality, aristocracy and democracy each would keep watch over the other.17
Machiavelli declared that even if the ancient Sparta of Lycurgus constituted an ideal example of 
this type of political synthesis, Rome was an unsurpassed model of a mix of monarchic, aristo-
cratic and democratic governance. This was precisely because Rome did not confine its dominion 
to the narrow limits of the city-state; on the contrary, it expanded its frontiers, identifying them 
with the borders of the then known world. If the secret of Rome’s longevity is to be found in its 
sophisticated structure, the secret of Rome’s territorial expansion and metamorphosis into em-
pire is to be found in the management of internal juxtapositions and conflicts between plebeians 
and patricians. These two processes are essentially identified with each other. 
In Negri and Hardt’s work, Machiavelli’s governmental model functions, therefore, as a meta-
phor to describe the emergence of a modern imperial structure, which they do not necessarily 
equate with any modern state or national entity (such as the United States).18
If, in their interpretational approach, Negri and Hardt have no difficulty identifying the executive/
military superiority of the Western world as a whole (the monarchical part of the imperial structure), 
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as well as the privileged holders of economic, social and cultural capital (the new “senate” or 
“parasitical aristocracy” in their words),19 then one should be in a position to investigate the space 
in which unmediated representation of social and economic interests occurs (the democratic 
dimension of the system). Convinced that politics in contemporary parliamentary democracies 
has been irreparably undermined, the two authors employ networks as a theoretical substitute 
for a latent expression of “democratic” control enforced by social subjects (in spite of their over-
determination of class) against the peremptoriness of statesmen (the operators of the political 
field), although the latter participate in the organization of networks which they would transform, 
from their point of view, into cliental or lobby networks.20
It is clear, therefore, that the writers’ use of the term “empire” as a metaphor presupposes the 
incorporation of the networks approach, seen through an axiological prism that has been shaped 
by the political tradition in which they participate. Refraining from taking a stance regarding this 
problem for the time being, it is evident that this theoretical “arbitrariness” is less useful in the 
search for the possible relation between “democratic social organization” and networks (this is 
the task of political scientists and the main responsibility of active citizens) than in describing the 
potential role that networks can play in the organization of imperial space. Are social networks 
rendered more necessary when an imperial political structure emerges owing to their ability to 
contribute to the homogenization of the social, cultural and economic diversity that inevitably 
characterizes empire?
Accordingly, the main goal here is to find a way to link the two levels of analysis, the normative-
political and the descriptive-scholarly. In pursuit of this goal, it is necessary to consider two 
key questions. On the one hand, it is necessary to explore whether the concept of networks is 
useful in decoding the collective social entities (such as class or social group)21 of the past, or in 
connection to questions of analysis of social systems or social change. On the other hand, it is 
important to ask whether there exists a connotation of the term “networks” in the context of the 
organization of political space in former and in emergent empires.
In addressing the first issue, namely the analytical potential of networks in dealing with empires, 
a number of examples from the Ottoman Empire will be looked at. Before doing so, however, it 
is necessary to provide some clarification of a theoretical nature. 
Imperial space is by its very nature structured in terms of networks: it develops from a center 
with shifting frontiers. The concept of frontier is viewed negatively by empire: it does not cor-
respond to some ‘no man’s land’ which characterizes the sliced and serial space in the age of 
nation states.22 There is no ‘no man’s land’ separating imperial space from the world of the 
‘barbarians’– only ‘Great Walls’.23
The ‘barbarians’ can invade imperial space at any moment without automatically destroying 
its sovereignty however. This is also the reason why, even when the ‘barbarians’ reached the 
walls of Rome or Constantinople, Beijing or Vienna, the empires in question did not collapse; 
empires collapse only when their centers collapse. In this case, collapse is absolute not when it 
comes from some external threat (as in the case of Moscow in 1812 for example), but when it 
represents the completion of a process of internal decomposition, making it impossible for the 
empire to guarantee stability over the enormous territories incorporated during its expansion, 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 08:43:32 |
80
From Machiavelli to the Sultans HISTOREIN
V
O
L
U
M
E
 5 (2005)
81
and when its legitimating ideology can no longer penetrate the various populations which have 
come under its sway.24 
As imperial time conflates past and future in the present dimension of the ruling prince’s body, 
sovereignty is essentially ‘spaced’. This means that space, as opposed to time, constitutes the 
main element in the structure of empire as long as space engulfs time, invalidating all pos-
sibilities of social, cultural and, especially, political evolution.25 The dynamics of the evolution of 
time is annulled, while space becomes homogeneous and continuous.26 This constantly allows 
the empire to present itself as ‘ecumenical’; nothing can dispute its sovereignty over the entire 
‘ecumene’, as long as the beginnings and furthest reaches of time are unified in a messianic 
incarnation: the person of the emperor.
This is the ultimate cause of the theoretical arbitrariness of Negri and Hardt: it should not 
be reduced to a superficial comparison between ‘ecumenical’ empires of the past and world 
sovereignty being imposed today by the modern Rome. Rather, it is based on a fundamental 
re-composition of the space-time relationship. The withdrawal of ideological forms of historical 
progress, connected with the culmination of the value-demands of the Enlightenment, signals 
the absorption of the time horizon by space, or rather, internalizes social subjects’ experience of 
time while at the same time the latter are interspersed as exchangeable and replaceable in an 
homogenized global landscape completely ruled by commercial relations. Time is transmuted 
into an esoteric experience and ceases to function as the field in which utopia exists: the ultimate 
restoration of religious discourse should be interpreted as evidence of this phenomenon.
Only in this way can the connection between empires and major monotheistic religions be 
firmly grasped, although all empires were not necessarily monotheistic or monoreligious. God 
is the sole potential external observer of a system internally complete at both the spatial and 
temporal levels.27 Consequently, an analysis of power networks is absolutely necessary when 
discussing empires, precisely because it relates to the issue of the constitution of structural 
relations on the basis of the sovereignty of the spatial paradigm.
On the Core-Periphery Structure
The vast territory of empires cannot remain unconsolidated and dispersed. Precisely for this 
reason, empires reproduce themselves in peripheral hubs that display an internal hierarchy 
analogous to that of the center. This relationship between core and periphery constitutes a key 
element of imperial political structure.28 Correspondingly, it is a structural feature of the develop-
ment of networks.29
At this point, it is worth noting how the relationship between center and periphery in past em-
pires has been interpreted in international studies of empire. In his thorough Revolutions, Na-
tions, Empires, Alexander Motyl points out that when we refer to empires we should keep in mind 
that they are not so much “states” as “systems”. These systems are substantially supported by the 
operation of a sovereign structure, that of core-periphery.30 This structure regulates sovereignty-
subordinate relations between core and peripheral elites. Motyl reproduces and adopts the 
ideas of Johan Galtung, who maintained that in typical empires, the center performs the work 
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of exclusive political mediator for the periphery and as a result excludes the possibility of interaction 
between peripheries. More specifically, Galtung noted that:
There are four rules defining this particular interaction structure (viz., between center and 
periphery in an empire):
1. Interaction between center and periphery is vertical;
2. Interaction between periphery and periphery is missing;
3. Multilateral interaction involving all three is missing;
4. Interaction with the outside world is monopolized by the center, with two implications:
a. Periphery interaction with other centers is missing;
b. Center as well as periphery interaction with periphery nations belonging to other center 
nations is missing.31
In commenting on Galtung’s thesis, Motyl does not deny the possible existence of interaction 
between the peripheries of an empire. He does reject, however, the idea that the center is indis-
pensable in mediating such interaction, particularly those forms he considers “significant”, such 
as political consultations, military cooperation, and security arrangements.32 If one examines 
an empire exclusively from the perspective of the political structures which the empire itself 
recognizes as valid, then one would have to agree with Galtung (as well as Motyl). Nevertheless, 
this approach fails to explain why the periphery at some moment of its own choosing succeeds 
in defecting from the center. 
Motyl further elaborates on Galtung’s structuralist approach by placing it within the framework of 
systems theory. Nonetheless, this approach still fails to account for a range of social or political-
ideological relations which an empire’s subjects can establish among themselves, outside and 
beyond the vertically hierarchical political structures which define empire. The study of networks 
is conceptually useful for it allows us to discern a series of horizontal forms of social and political 
organization, regardless of whether these were legitimized by the center or not. 
According to Motyl, networks were essentially organized as having as their basic node the 
empire’s center; due to his specialization, he observed that Moscow and Saint Petersburg for 
example constituted the epicenter of all road, railway and transportation networks in Tsarist 
Russia as well as the Soviet Union, a fact that obviously impacted decisively on the maintenance 
and extension of the core elite’s strength. However, while we accept Motyl’s astute observation 
as regards empires generally (organization of communication networks around a central node-
capital), we should also point out that power networks are not organized monopolistically by the 
center: the equivalent participation of the leading regional elites is necessary.
This is why, in times of crisis, these networks have the potential to become autonomous from 
control by the center, constituting a lever of important political and constitutional change. This is so 
largely because they favor the shift of hegemony between social groups or classes. However, we 
should stress that the networks concept cannot replace the theoretical value of conceptual tools 
such as class, social group, elite, community, or social mobility. What the concept of networks can 
achieve is to lend real content to the abstract nature of these concepts, offering a potential field for 
description of social agents’ activities in relation to social, political, and cultural structures.
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In particular, its usefulness can be demonstrated in the investigation of the terms on which a 
concrete social group manages to impose hegemony at the political and social level. Networks, 
however, do not constitute a ‘metonymy’ to reveal social or political agents; on the contrary, they 
are the result of agents’ actions. The network cannot be identified with the social class or the elite; 
rather, it constitutes a preferential means of communication by which members of social classes, 
groups and elites can reorganize the terms of dominance/sovereignty or subordination.
Networks cannot ultimately define a political or ideological entity because they represent an 
elemental form of social organization. More precisely, they tread a tightrope between the politi-
cal and the scholarly, because they initially develop at the primary level where communicative 
relations first emerge from social relations. A network form of organization may be discerned at 
various levels: from the family33 and commercial networks in pre-capitalist societies to networks 
of bridge building gangs in the Balkans or to Masonic lodges. In most instances, the concept is 
defined by the particular researcher’s focus on one level of social formation, where the content 
of the agents’ actions (activities) remains recognizable. Moreover, the analysis of networks 
may help the observer-researcher discern the emergence of different structures for viewing 
the world and different or competing interests or ‘concerns’. 
The literature relating to social networks has accumulated enormously in recent years.34 While most 
studies have tended to focus on the analysis of interpersonal networks,35 a considerable number of 
approaches have dealt with questions concerning the formation of cliques36 and policy networks.37 
As has been stated, this article will not focus on networks in general but on that category of networks 
involved in the management of politics, where networks function as accumulators of political power, 
permitting them to become the privileged purveyors of symbolic capital. Consequently, the basic 
problem dwelt with here is that of defining the preconditions necessary for the conversion of social 
networks, be they interpersonal, familial, or interest networks in general, into power networks.38
If we wish to distinguish power networks in a stricter methodological sense from family net-
works, cliques, political parties, or even commercial networks, we could say that a combination 
of some or all of the preceding might, under certain well-defined conditions, represent power 
networks.39 Ideally: 
1. Their activity extends to two or more peripheries of the empire. Activity is not defined by 
a one-way center–periphery relationship where the power exercised by the two sides is 
disproportional;
2. Their activity reorganizes potential power relations at the local as well as central level;
3. They are organized in hubs of relatively equal power vis-à-vis e overall functionality of the 
network;
4. They include members from both the central and the peripheral elite; and
5. They form a ‘space’ in the sense that they may function as producers of social space by 
controlling information which the center cannot always process. The inability of an empire to 
control the space over which it theoretically rules is apparent in such cases. 
Consequently, power networks should be positioned in the wider category of social networks, and 
the main question regarding them is the precondition for the transformation of a social network 
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into a power network. If the relation of periphery–periphery exists, then we must search for ad-
ditional factors which determine the network’s character, such as preferential position at the mo-
ment of social system’s collapse, access to income and resources, participation in the constitution 
of new political horizons and alternatives to those of the center. In the case of the revolutionaries 
of the Morea, for example, who did not have a clear picture of what constituted a nation-state since 
the concept was only taking shape at roughly the same period in the West, their conflict with the 
center made the creation of a modern constitutional structure possible.
Generally, the network’s sociopolitical power is derived from the accumulation of economic 
and cultural capital. However, the accumulation of economic as well as cultural capital requires 
the internal differentiation of the network and its expansion beyond the boundaries of the family 
enterprise. This expansion may take place either in the direction of political figures in order to 
ensure maximum long-term financial returns, or in the direction of privileged arbitrators of 
cultural capital. 
The Case of the Orthodox Millet in the Ottoman Empire
The imperial phenomenon is particularly complex and extensive, thus making it difficult to draw 
firm conclusions about the type of social constitution which it represents. The overwhelming ma-
jority of imperial morphemes appeared and consolidated outside the borders of Europe. The ques-
tion becomes more complicated if we consider the theoretical proposals that have been formulated 
in recent years regarding the categorizations for classifying historical empires, such as continental 
and overseas empire, predatory and developmental empire,40 and scattered and territorially con-
tiguous empire.41 The Ottoman Empire is usually assigned to the second of the above dipoles.
Although the Ottoman was certainly not a direct descendant of the Roman Empire, a certain level 
of caution is required here, given that it represented for centuries a model of “Oriental/Eastern 
Despotism” for the producers of Orientalist discourse in the West. Nevertheless, it is very difficult 
to correlate the basic elements of its constitutional structure with those of the Polybian model. 
The empire was ultimately based on the authoritarian rule of the sultan, although new power 
centers – such as the harem – slowly emerged which served to ‘decentralize’ the decision-
making process. The empire also upheld a constitutional structure that rendered the formation 
of a hereditary aristocracy impossible, although the state was itself transformed into a field of 
political conflict between two de facto ‘aristocratic’ categories: the devşirme and sipahi officials. 
Another aspect of the Ottoman Empire was that it built its requisite legitimizing consent via the 
protection that the state provided for small landlords, although individual property rights on 
cultivated lands were guaranteed only in the mid-nineteenth century. 
However, beyond these contradictory conjunctions (in the context of the Western Canon), the 
Ottoman state was characterized by its successful management and control of periphery elites.42 
Certainly, Charles Tilly was right to claim that there are no empires “compatible” with democratic 
governance, given that the latter involves the distribution of citizenship rights. Yet, empires recog-
nized some degree of regional autonomy, mostly among provincial elites, which were useful for the 
detachment of surpluses from subject peoples for use by the empire’s own core population.43
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Beyond these particular features, however, the Ottoman Empire possessed a number of distinctive 
characteristics: while it constitutes an example of an Islamic empire, there coexisted within it 
adherents of other monotheistic religions. Of course these religious communities, known as 
millets, progressively acquired institutional status and were recognized by the Ottoman state 
as mechanisms of social and political control. The special nature of these communities further 
complicated the process of controlling the peripheries from the center, since it involved not only 
the management of interests, extraction of surpluses and crisis management, but the control 
and management of symbols as well. 
In the nationalistic mythology of the Balkan peoples in particular, the degree of autonomy enjoyed by 
these communities has been overstated and for obvious reasons. The policy of ‘national awakening’ was 
easier to justify had there been a long period of ‘self-government’ by its leading forces previously.
Clergy, notables and tradesmen (and occasionally units of irregular armed forces) constituted the 
main social groups that jointly shaped power networks within Ottoman space. The dominant net-
works of the Orthodox millet were substantially defined by the relations developed between these 
groups and Ottoman central power, as well as with local representatives of the Ottoman state. 
I will make use of two examples from the Ottoman Empire.44 The first concerns the emergence, 
through networks, of a dominant sociopolitical structure, while the second concerns the role of net-
work organizations in the dissolution of the Empire. Before proceeding, however, we should note 
some general characteristics relating to the formation of leadership elites in the Ottoman Empire. 
An examination of the Orthodox millet involves an analysis of political-ideological relations on the 
margins of the Ottoman state and, more specifically, a consideration of how its leadership elite 
emerged. This emergence, Theda Skocpol has proposed, was not only the sum of the influences 
wrought by international interventions, such as the Great Powers and their bases of support in 
the Ottoman Empire, including in this case the Constantinople Patriarchate.45 It must also have 
resulted from conditions different to those obtaining in a modern nation-state.46 In such cases, 
particularly in semi-peripheral regions, the leadership elite developed as a result of its ability to 
participate in various state mechanisms and the state’s coffers) and was in a position to compel 
political figures to adapt its policies, thus possessing “relative autonomy” in Skocpol’s terms.47 
In empires, and particularly in the Ottoman version, the leadership elite of the millet formed on 
the margins of the state machinery under the asphyxiating control of imperial political personnel. 
This ‘peripheral’ position of the millet depended not only on its level of legal compliance but was 
the necessary prerequisite for both the Phanariot families as well as the most dynamic elements 
of the bourgeois class to establish networks of power and influence. Interference by the Great 
Powers was considerable, but was limited by internal ‘filters’, mainly the need for the leadership 
elite and its sub-groups to maintain and extend their influence networks. 
Bearing in mind all the above, we will now proceed to an analysis of the second example, which 
concerns the important question of sociopolitical transition related to the declaration of the 
Greek Revolution in the Peloponnese in March 1821.
The role of the Philiki Etairia (or Friendly Society) and the theoretical construct which informed 
it at least initially, were both instrumental in the Uprising. The society began as a self-protecting 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 08:43:32 |
84
From Machiavelli to the Sultans HISTOREIN
V
O
L
U
M
E
 5 (2005)
85
network for those involved in amassing commercial capital,48 and who were being confronted 
by a range of consequences as a result of the economic crisis after the Napoleonic Wars.49 After 
1818, a series of distinguished families joined the Etairia’s ranks, thus contributing to the de-
velopment of the pre-revolutionary crisis. The case of the Deligiannes family is one of the most 
interesting and noteworthy. This family’s source of legitimacy and power was not based solely 
on its ability to function as a mediator at the level of tax collection; it derived also from the family’s 
representation of the interests of the imperial royal family in the Peloponnese, specifically those 
of Beyhan Sultana, the sister of former Sultan Selim III. This family led a coalition of interests 
in the regions of Messenia and Karytaina, which constituted Beyhan Sultana’s malikâne or tax 
farm, granted to her for her lifetime. What then drove a family with such close ties to the Ottoman 
center to pursue a course involving revolution and armed struggle?
In answering this question, interpretative models of the type used in the ‘national awakening’ con-
text should probably be excluded, particularly when one considers the family’s prominent role in 
expunging the klephts of the Morea in 1805–1806.50. An analysis of the internal tensions among the 
family’s elders may provide the solution, however. The privileged relationship of Deligiannis family 
members to the center-capital compelled their major rival, Sotirakis Lontos, to seek a balance of 
power by forming another network that had the discreet support of the decentralized political state 
established by Ali Paşa of Ioannina. Rivalry between these two potential power networks led to the 
mutual annihilation of the leaders of both clans, which sought privileged alliances with opponent 
interest groups among Ottoman political personnel in Istanbul (Sotirakis Lontos was executed in 
1812 and Ioannes Deligiannes, his main calumniator, in 1816). This internecine feud only ended with 
the signing of an agreement in 1816 by the other leading families of the Morea.
However, the agreement, as well as the period leading up to 1821 in general, was characterized by 
the leading presence of another prominent Peloponnesian family, the Perroukas. What advan-
tages did this family have over the Deligiannes family? In my estimation, the Perroukas family 
managed to establish a more powerful and disseminated network, while at the same time taking 
advantage of the mutual weakening of its Deligiannes and Lontos rivals. The three Perroukas 
brothers, who were based in Corinth, Patras and Constantinople, formed a network of influence, 
which the Deligiannes family could not match. While the Deligiannes family had managed to do 
away with Sotirakes Lontos by allying themselves with the local administrator (vali) and by virtue 
of the protection afforded by Beyhan Sultana, it also managed to retain its position and fortune 
even after the execution of its leader in 1816. Nevertheless, it still could not compete with the 
Perroukas family. Ultimately, however, it was the Perroukas family’s success in acquiring the 
right to maintain a permanent representative (vekil) in Constantinople that prodded the Deli-
giannes family into joining the Etairia, a network of a very different type and one whose dynamics 
they were naturally unable to control.51 
Therefore in this case the vertically built core-periphery relationship, represented by the 
dependence of the notable family of Deligiannes on the Ottoman palace, was substantially 
disturbed by a network of the Lontos clan, which we would say was constructed ‘horizontally’ 
(Epirus–Peloponnese): namely, it offered the possibility of the extension of Ali Paşa’s influence 
in the Peloponnese, whose semi-independent state-entity had come to dominate in the margins 
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of the Ottoman periphery. Although the Ottoman state immediately intervened, repressing the 
‘centrifugal’ forces that had emerged, the dynamics released because of this consolidation of 
a ‘horizontal’ network (that is one independent from the core-periphery structure) created the 
terms for the integration of the notable’s clans into a conspiratorial network with revolutionary 
characteristics, which emerged when the tradesmen networks of solidarity struck from the 
economic crisis of 1815.
Another interesting example of interrelations between periphery-periphery in the Ottoman Em-
pire is the case of the enormous land holdings the Orthodox Patriarchate gradually acquired in 
the Danubian Principalities and the two monastic communities of Mounts Athos and Sinai. The 
acquisition of these lands or “dedicated monasteries” had begun during the era of the Moldovlach 
rulers of the seventeenth century, before the Phanariot families began occupying the thrones of 
Moldovlachia, which intensified the process of land transfer.52 The reason why the Moldovlachians 
had to resort to this policy of land transfer is by no means unrelated to the extended migra-
tions of Vlach-speaking populations from the greater Epirus region and Western Macedonia to 
Constantinople, Bucharest, Iaşi, Constanţa, and Sibiu. The important role played by Epirotes 
in organizing this particular network, which was involved in the exploitation of ecclesiastical 
revenues, is apparent from the fact that the enlarged holdings of the monasteries of Epirus and 
Moldovlachia were those that submitted to the control of the Constantinople Patriarchate and 
the other patriarchates of the Orthodox East. This gave the elite among those supporting the 
monasteries of the Orthodox Patriarchates de facto control of the enormous income flowing 
from the principalities. This also meant, of course, control of the elections to the Orthodox pa-
triarchal sees in the east, such as Jerusalem, Antioch and Alexandria. In this way, a migratory 
movement connecting two peripheral regions of the Ottoman Empire progressively transformed 
into the strongest power axis of the Orthodox millet. 
The cases of the pre-revolutionary Peloponnese and the monastic properties in Moldovlachia 
offer excellent examples not only of the significance of the development of a network within the 
wider imperial space (characterized by multi-faceted interaction between many peripheries with 
participation by the center, a type not included in Galtung’s model but partially accepted by Motyl). 
They also afford an understanding of how organizations of networks of traders, elders, or clerics 
transform themselves into genuine power networks.
Conclusion
To return to our original question: on the basis of the above how might the two discussions be linked? 
How might the answer to the value of networks at the descriptive-scholarly level provide a herme-
neutic path to answering the critical question relating to their normative-political dimension? 
In order to transform into power networks, networks of migratory movements or networks for the 
exploitation of tax revenues had to broaden their influence beyond that of the top-down relation-
ship between center and periphery. They had to organize the interests of core interest groups and 
peripheral elites, which were not visible from the empire’s center. At this point, we should consider 
how networks are being developed within the imperial space currently under construction.53 
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In one sense, empire is the model for the domination of space over time, and of self-referentiality 
over external reference. In reality, what is now being labeled as “empire” is nothing more than 
the integration of a process involving the domination of the paradigm of space.
There are two basic concepts concerning network theory which could prove valuable and suffice 
for an approach to collective historical formations in empires like that of the Ottomans:
a) The concept of centrality, which can be exceptionally helpful in investigating the relation-
ship between the network and the structures of political authority.54 This relates to the divi-
sion of power within a network, where one must define the focal and peripheral points of the 
process of power accumulation.
b) The concept of the clique, which can objectify the means by which interest groups are 
formed, particularly on the periphery of an empire.55 This concerns the nature of relations 
between the members of the network and in particular whether they communicate directly or 
indirectly through intermediaries.56 This feature naturally determines the degree of dependency 
of one member on another.57
In the two examples to which we have referred, it is worth noting that the action of these groups 
is not limited to the management of economic interests. Rather, their entrance into the political 
realm presupposes multiple sources of power. At the same time, they defend their sources 
of income by allying themselves with the center. In addition, their dispersion across imperial 
space may allow their management of cultural capital to gradually undermine the foundational 
characteristics of imperial domination. As a consequence, the action of cliques and the networks 
of interests they compose are likely to be transformed into power networks that subvert the 
centrality of imperial space. A dynamic perspective of networks must take into account their 
substantial connection to the cultural factor and the continuous contradictions to which the activi-
ties of the network’s agents can give rise.
Arguably, past networks – at any rate those that shaped the terms for the development of po-
litical activity – consolidated and assisted the organization of the interests of those in society 
already in possession of some economic capital (as in the case of merchants and elders) or 
cultural capital (as in the case of clerics). Arguably, the social and political aristocracy of an 
imperial society is formed within power networks. Although networks may be organized and 
operate in a horizontal, “democratic” fashion, this in no way means that they always contribute 
to democratic social organization. The history of empires has demonstrated this, and I fear that 
the future will continue to bear this out. 
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